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BIRCHFIELD V. NORTH DAKOTA:
WARRANTLESS BREATH TESTS
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
SARA JANE SCHLAFSTEIN∗
INTRODUCTION
In Birchfield v. North Dakota,1 the United States Supreme Court
addressed privacy concerns related to necessary blood alcohol
concentration (“BAC”) testing during DUI stops and arrests. To
determine if these searches are constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court employed a balancing test, weighing the
government’s interest in deterring and punishing drunk driving with
the test’s intrusion on individuals’ privacy. The Court concluded that
warrantless breath tests are constitutional when conducted incident to
a lawful DUI arrest.
This commentary discusses the case Bernard v. Minnesota,2 which
was consolidated with another case into Birchfield. The Court’s holding
applied to all three cases that involved the same question presented,
but then discussed the applicability of its holding to each case.3
Accordingly, this commentary first focuses on Bernard and then
broadly discusses the Court’s holding.
I. FACTS
This controversy arises from an incident that occurred on August 5,
2012 in Dakota County, Minnesota.4 At around 7:00 PM, police officers
were notified that three intoxicated men were attempting to pull their

Copyright © 2017 Sara Jane Schlafstein.
∗
J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2018.
1. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) consolidated with Bernard v.
Minnesota, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) and Beylund v. North Dakota, 859 N.W.2d 403
(N.D. 2015).
2. 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014).
3. See infra Part V.
4. Brief of Respondent at 2, Bernard v. Minnesota, (No. 14-1470) (2016).
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boat out of a river using a truck.5 When the officers approached the
three men, they noticed an odor of alcohol.6 William Bernard
(“Petitioner”), who was identified by two witnesses as the driver,
admitted to the officers that he had consumed alcohol, but denied
driving the truck.7 The officers, however, found the keys to the truck in
Petitioner’s hand.8 They subsequently arrested Petitioner and informed
him that refusal to submit to a chemical alcohol test is a crime under
Minnesota law.9 Without securing a search warrant, the officers decided
to perform a breath test to determine Petitioner’s blood alcohol
content.10 Petitioner refused to submit to the testing and was
subsequently charged with two counts of the crime of First Degree
Driving While Impaired – Test Refusal in violation of Minnesota law.11
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges in the District Court
of Dakota County, Minnesota.12 Acknowledging that warrantless
searches are generally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the
trial court dismissed the charges and concluded that “because no
warrant was obtained and none of the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement apply, no lawful basis exist[ed] in this case to
request submission to a chemical test.”13
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling.14
The court found that, because the constitutional requirements for
securing a warrant existed prior to the test request, the officers could
have obtained a warrant, so the warrantless breath test was
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.15
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the court affirmed the
decision of the appellate court but on different grounds. The court
stated that the appellate court’s reasoning was “contrary to basic
principles of Fourth Amendment law” because “[a] warrantless search
is generally unreasonable, unless it falls into one of the recognized

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Brief for Petitioner at 7, Bernard v. Minnesota, (No. 14-1470) (2016).
Id.
Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subds. 2–3 (2014)).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Bernard, (No. 14-1470).
Id. at 59a.
Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 3.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 43a.
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exceptions to the warrant requirement.”16 A search incident to a lawful
arrest is one such exception.
The court found that searches of an arrestee’s person during a
lawful arrest are per se constitutional and require no further
justification.17 Thus, the court concluded that, when conducted during a
lawful arrest, a warrantless breath test does not violate the Fourth
Amendment because it falls under the search-incident-to-arrest
exception.18
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”19 It further states that “no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.”20 In general, a search is unreasonable
if there is no warrant.21 The warrant requirement is however subject to
exceptions.22 In United States v. Robinson,23 the Court provided one
such exception, that a warrantless search may be conducted incident to
a lawful arrest.24 When an officer makes a lawful arrest, she may search
not only the body of the arrestee, but also the surrounding area and any
possessions in the arrestee’s control.25 In Chimel v. California,26 the
Court explained that this exception exists to protect an officer’s safety
and to prevent the destruction of evidence.27 The search-incident-to16. Id. at 7a.
17. Id. at 8a.
18. Id. at 9a.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. Id.
21. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 495 (2011).
22. Id. In addition to the lawful arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception allows
for a warrantless search when law enforcement does not have enough time to secure a warrant
due to an emergency. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978). The Supreme Court has
determined that the natural and inevitable dissipation of blood alcohol concentration does not
necessarily trigger the exigent circumstances exception. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556
(2013). The exigent circumstances exception must be determined on a case-by-case basis using a
fact-based inquiry. Id.
23. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
24. Id. at 235.
25. Id. at 224.
26. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
27. Id. at 763.
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arrest exception is categorical rather than subject to a case-by-case
analysis.28 In Robinson, the Court clarified that the fact that an arrest is
lawful itself justifies “a full search of the person.”29 Accordingly, an
officer does not need to assess the probability that the arrestee will
obtain a weapon or destroy evidence in order to conduct a warrantless
search upon a lawful arrest.
In Riley v. California,30 the Court reaffirmed the categorical rule set
forth in Robinson, and described how to apply the rule in modern
situations, such as searches of cell phones, that were unfathomable
when the Fourth Amendment was ratified.31 In such cases, a court must
consider “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”32 Thus, the Court will
employ a balancing test to determine if the government’s interest in
conducting the search outweighs the intrusion on the arrestee’s privacy.
B. Minnesota’s Driving While Impaired Laws
In 1961, Minnesota enacted an implied consent law to combat the
dangers of drunk driving.33 As of 2014, the law states that “any person
who drives, operates, or is in physical control of a motor vehicle within
this state or any boundary water of this state consents . . . to a chemical
test of that person’s blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of
determining the presence of alcohol, a controlled substance or its
metabolite, or a hazardous substance.”34 The act made consent to
chemical testing upon arrest a condition of driving on public roads.
Although the law allowed a suspected drunk driver to withdraw
consent, such withdrawal would result in license sanctions for the
driver. In 1971, Minnesota passed a per se drunk driving act.35 Under
this law, the state no longer has to prove that a defendant is actually
impaired while driving. Instead, a court will presume intoxication if a
defendant’s BAC is above 0.08%.36 Because the per se statute can only

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1556.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
Id. at 2484.
Id. at 2478 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 1.
Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subds. 1(a) (2014).
Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 1.
Id.
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be enforced by determining a driver’s BAC level, the state
subsequently made it a criminal offense “for any person to refuse to
submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood, breath, or urine” when
lawfully stopped by an officer for suspected drunk driving.37
III. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner asserts that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling is
“shockingly wrong” in that “it untethers the search-incident-to-arrest
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement from the
exception’s rationale, while giving greater constitutional protection to
an arrestee’s pockets or handbag than to the arrestee’s body.”38
Petitioner agrees with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s dissenting
opinion that the ruling “fundamentally departs from longstanding
Fourth Amendment principles, and nullifies the warrant requirement
in nearly every drunk-driving case.”39
Petitioner claims that the Court has consistently explained that the
purpose of the search-incident-to-arrest exception is to protect officer
safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence.40 Alcohol in the
blood dissolves at a stable, predictable rate and is not subject to the
control of the individual.41 Petitioner draws a distinction between the
active destruction of evidence by the arrestee and the loss of evidence
due to a naturally occurring process.42 According to Petitioner, only
concern for the active destruction of evidence can constitute sufficient
grounds for conducting a warrantless search under the search-incidentto-arrest exception.43 Thus, Petitioner contends that the concern of
alcohol naturally dissipating in the blood stream is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless breath test.44 Additionally, a person’s breath
cannot be used as a weapon that would cause harm to an officer.45 For
these reasons, Petitioner argues that a breath test does not further the
purposes of the search-incident-to-arrest exception and, therefore, a

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

M.S.A. § 169A.20, subd. 2.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 3.
Id.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 12.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 11–12.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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warrantless breath test is not a valid search under the Fourth
Amendment.46
Nonetheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the searchincident-to-arrest exception applies in this case because a warrantless
search of an arrestee’s person is categorically valid during a lawful
arrest.47 In Robinson, the Court stated that searches of an arrestee’s
body incident to a lawful arrest are constitutional regardless of “the
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence
would in fact be found.”48 Following this reasoning, a breath test during
a lawful arrest requires no justification of protecting officers or
preserving evidence.
Petitioner argues that this interpretation is a misreading of the
Court’s intention.49 Petitioner asserts that the Court instead “ask[s] . . .
whether application of the search incident to arrest doctrine to this
particular category of [search] would ‘untether the rule from the
justifications underlying’” the exception.50 Accordingly, Petitioner
argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s “holding can fairly be said
to turn Fourth Amendment doctrine on its head, and simply cannot be
reconciled with this Court’s decisions.”51 The rationales of protecting
officer safety and preservation of evidence must apply to searches of
both the property and the person of the arrestee during a lawful
arrest.52 Breath tests, as Petitioner explains, can never alone protect
officer safety or preserve evidence, and, thus, it is a category of search
that is not permissible without a warrant under the search-incident-toarrest justifications.53
Petitioner further argues that there is no difference between a
warrantless blood test and breath test in the context of a DUI
investigation.54 The Minnesota Supreme Court drew a distinction
between breath tests and blood tests, stating that the latter are more
intrusive.55 Petitioner argues that the Court has “explicitly held that
breath tests are searches for Fourth Amendment purposes.”56 When
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 17.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
Id.
Id. (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014)).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989)).
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weighing the privacy interests of an arrestee against the government’s
interest in reducing instances of drunk driving,57 a breath test should be
considered a “profound intrusion into a person’s bodily integrity.”58
Rather than a usual exhalation of air, a breath test captures alveolar air
from deep inside of the lungs.59 To collect this air sample, an arrestee
must consistently blow air into the Breathalyzer for several seconds.60
As further evidence that breath tests and blood tests should be treated
similarly in terms of privacy interests, Petitioner points to different
states’ treatment of these types of tests, asserting that most states that
impose restrictions on the use of warrantless blood tests impose
identical restrictions on the use of warrantless breath tests.61
For these reasons, Petitioner argues that the warrantless breath test
at issue here was unconstitutional, and accordingly, the state may not
impose criminal penalties on an individual who refuses an
unconstitutional search.62 Thus, Petitioner claims that the Court should
reverse the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
B. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent argues that Minnesota’s test-refusal statute is
constitutional because a warrantless breath test is permissible under
the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Respondent begins the
analysis with the notion that warrantless searches are generally
considered unreasonable and thus are prohibited under the Fourth
Amendment.63 There are, however, a number of well recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.64 The exception at issue here is
the search-incident-to-arrest exception which allows an officer to
search an arrestee’s person or property when the search is incident to
a lawful arrest.65 Respondent argues that in Robinson, the Court
adopted “the bright-line rule that police officers may, without a
warrant, always conduct a full search of a person who has been lawfully
arrested.”66 Rejecting a case-by-case approach, the Court stated that an
57. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–89 (2014).
58. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 24 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 12, at 28a (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting)).
59. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 24.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 25.
62. Id. at 26.
63. Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 8.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 9 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
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arrest based on probable cause is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, and that any search incident to such arrest is permissible
without further justification.67 Respondent contends that this brightline rule was later rearticulated in McNeely where, in addition to citing
Robinson, the Court “recognized a limited class of traditional
exceptions to the warrant requirement that apply categorically and
thus do not require an assessment of whether policy justifications
underlying the exception . . . are implicated in a particular case.”68
Next, Respondent argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court
correctly applied this categorical rule, holding that a warrantless breath
test incident to a lawful arrest for DUI does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.69 Accordingly, because the compelled breath test is
constitutional, the state may impose criminal sanctions on an arrestee
for refusing to submit to the testing.70 Additionally, because the
categorical rule applies, Respondent rejects Petitioner’s argument that
because they do not further officer safety or evidence preservation,
breath tests do not fall under the search-incident-to-arrest exception.71
This notion, Respondent argues, cannot be reconciled with the
categorical rule articulated in both Robinson and McNeely.72
Respondent also rejects Petitioner’s argument that breath tests do
not further the goal of preserving evidence.73 Because alcohol naturally
dissipates in an individual’s blood, postponement of breath testing will
negatively affect the test results.74 Respondent further argues that the
Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in drawing a distinction
between breath testing and blood testing. In Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Association,75 this Court stated that “[u]nlike blood tests,
breath tests do not require piercing of the skin and may be conducted
safely outside a hospital environment and with a minimum of
inconvenience or embarrassment.”76 Accordingly, Respondent
contends that breath tests appropriately fall within the search-incidentto-arrest doctrine.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 10 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 n.3 (2013)).
Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 10.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
489 U.S. 602 (1989).
Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 12 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625).
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Respondent next argues in the alternative that “Minnesota’s test
refusal statute is constitutional as applied to breath tests because a
warrantless breath test administered to a suspect lawfully arrested for
drunk driving satisfies the general reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.”77 The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all
privacy intrusions, but instead prohibits only those that are
unreasonable.78 When a categorical exception, as described in
Robinson, does not apply to a certain category of searches, the Court
will “balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related
concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.”79 When
employing this balancing test, the Court will examine a particular
search by weighing the government’s interest against the degree of
intrusion on an individual’s privacy.80
Respondent contends that implied-consent and test-refusal laws
effectively promote the government’s significant and legitimate
interest in combating the dangers of drunk driving.81 The Court has
repeatedly “recognized the costs of drunk driving as a substantial and
compelling governmental interest.”82 Minnesota’s implied-consent and
test-refusal laws have been effective in deterring individuals from
driving while intoxicated and has lowered the rate of test refusal during
lawful DUI arrests.83 Respondent maintains that the laws are also
narrowly tailored to further the government’s legitimate interest
because an officer is only allowed to compel a breath test when she has
probable cause to believe that the arrestee is driving under the
influence of alcohol.84 The application of implied-consent and testrefusal laws is further limited because before imposing any criminal
punishment, a neutral magistrate judge will dismiss the case if she
determines that the officer lacked the requisite probable cause.85 Thus,
Respondent argues that because the implied-consent and test-refusal
laws are narrowly tailored and effectively further the government’s

77. Id. at 13.
78. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 15; see also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (noting the dangers with
which drunk driving burdens society).
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id. at 19.
85. Id. at 23.
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interest in limiting drunk driving, they should be upheld by the Court
as constitutional.86
Respondent next explains that in Skinner, the Court found that
breath tests constitute a lesser intrusion on privacy than blood tests.87
Respondent explains that “the breath test itself simply requires the
suspect to blow into a straw-like mouthpiece attached to the end of a
tube that is connected to the [Breathalyzer] . . . anywhere from four to
fourteen seconds.”88 Unlike a blood test, breath tests only reveal
information about the amount of alcohol in an arrestee’s
bloodstream.89 Thus, according to Respondent, the implied-consent and
test-refusal laws at issue are a minimal intrusion on an individual’s
privacy and should be upheld.90
For these reasons, Respondent argues that warrantless breath tests
during a lawful DUI arrest are constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment, and thus the imposition of criminal sanctions for testrefusal is correspondingly constitutional.
IV. HOLDING
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that “[b]ecause breath tests are significantly less intrusive
than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement
interests, . . . a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as
a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving.”91 As such,
warrantless breath tests incident to a lawful arrest are constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment.
V. ANALYSIS
The Court came to the correct conclusion in Birchfield v. North
Dakota, upholding warrantless breath tests during lawful DUI arrests
as constitutional.
The Court began its analysis by examining the privacy interests
implicated in breath and blood tests, finding that “breath tests do not
implicat[e] significant privacy concerns.92 Analogizing the act as similar
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 19. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 19.
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016).
Id. at 2164 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626).
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to “blowing up a party balloon,” the Court reasoned that the physical
invasiveness of a breath test is minimal because it merely requires the
arrestee to blow into a straw connected to the testing machine for a
period of four to fifteen seconds.93 As the Court explained, breath tests
are only capable of revealing minimal information about the alcohol
content in the arrestee’s breath, and the nature of the test it unlikely to
cause heightened embarrassment for an individual during an arrest.94
The Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the test is intrusive
because it requires the arrestee to provide a sample of aveolar (deep
lung) air, stating that breathing is a necessary and common
occurrence.95 The Court contrasted the privacy concerns inherent in
breath tests with those implicated in blood tests, and determined that
blood tests are more physically invasive because they require an
unnatural piercing of the skin.96 The Court was correct in drawing a
distinction between breath tests and blood tests. Because breath tests
are minimally invasive, the privacy concern associated with warrantless
searched are much less prevalent with breath tests than with blood
tests.
The Court then considered the government’s interest in obtaining
alcohol content test results for individuals suspected of drunk driving.97
The Court determined that “[t]he States and the Federal Government
have a ‘paramount interest . . . in preserving the safety of . . . public
highways.’”98 Drunk driving is a primary cause of traffic deaths and
injuries.99 In addition to neutralizing the threat posed by drunk drivers
who have already gotten behind the wheel, the government also has a
compelling interest in creating effective “deterrent[s] to drunk driving”
so that such individuals make responsible decisions and do not become
a safety threat.100
In its attempt to balance the government’s interest with individuals’
rights to privacy, the Court was correct in determining that the
government has a strong interest in protecting the safety of citizens.
Some searches without a warrant are necessary in order for the
government to effectively keep its citizens safe, and the interest of
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 2176.
Id. at 2177.
Id.
Id. at 2178.
Id.
Id. (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)).
Id. at 2178.
Id. at 2179 (quoting Mackey, 443 U.S. at 18).
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safety outweighs the concern of minimal privacy intrusion associated
with breath tests, and thus, warrantless breath tests are constitutional.
The Court then addressed Petitioner’s objection to considering
breath tests under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Petitioner
argued that an officer can only conduct a warrantless search to protect
the officer’s safety or to protect evidence from destruction. The Court
rejected the distinction that Petitioner drew between active destruction
of evidence and loss of evidence through a natural process.101 The Court
stated that “[i]n both situations the State is justifiably concerned that
evidence may be lost, and [Petitioner] does not explain why the cause
of the loss should be dispositive.”102 Many Supreme Court decisions
have recognized a state’s interest in preservation of evidence rather
than merely preventing the destruction of evidence.103
The per se approach adopted by the Supreme Court, which permits
warrantless breath tests incident to lawful DUI arrests may be criticized
as inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment because it effectively
nullifies the warrant requirement in drunk driving arrests. The Fourth
Amendment, however, only prohibits unreasonable searches. Because
the government’s interest in protecting the safety of its citizens is so
paramount, and because the method of testing is minimally invasive, a
warrantless breath test during a lawful DUI arrest cannot be
categorized as an unreasonable search.
For practical reasons, the Court was correct in deciding that a
warrant is not necessary for breath tests incident to a lawful DUI arrest.
Requiring an officer to obtain a warrant for breath testing would likely
encumber courts, adding to their already busy dockets. This could leave
officers unable to obtain a warrant in time to effectively administer a
breath test. Additionally, the implied-consent law is necessary to
incentivize suspected drunk drivers to take the breath test. Without
breath tests, officers and prosecutors would not be able to prove a DUI
case due to lack of evidence. Before enacting the implied-consent law,
penalties for drunk driving were greater than penalties for refusing to
take a breath test. This provided an incentive for drivers to refuse to
take the test in order to avoid the drunk driving penalties and instead
settle for the less severe refusal penalties. As such, absent the impliedconsent law, drivers would be more likely to refuse testing which would

101. Id. at 2182
102. Id.
103. Id.
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reduce the government’s ability to effectively monitor and punish
drunk drivers.
CONCLUSION
While Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is designed to protect
individuals’ privacy, it allows for warrantless searches under limited
circumstances when the government’s interest outweighs the intrusion
on privacy. A breath test during a lawful DUI arrest is such a
circumstance. Thus the Court was correct in concluding that a
warrantless breath test incident to a lawful DUI arrest is constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment.

